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I write this review to reflect on the contents 
of the book Philosophy for physicians (1) written 
by the renowned Argentine epistemologist Mario 
Bunge. The book was recently published in Spain 
and gave rise to various conferences and inter-
views in December 2012. This text is not a classic 
recension, but a set of opinions on the ideas the 
book covers or suggests. Due to the wide range of 
topics the book addresses, and the controversial 
nature of many of them, the material is of great 
relevance to public health professionals.
From my point of view, the material offers a 
great deal of insight, but also casts some shadows 
that should be critically analyzed. Such an 
analysis corresponds with the work’s invitation for 
discussion: “in the sciences, doubt is better than 
the firm belief in dogmas” (1 p.91). It is therefore 
not my aim to give a thorough review of the book. 
While this text is rather extensive, it is not because 
there are many points with which I disagree, but 
rather because the justification of the points with 
which I dissent calls for an unhurried and respon-
sible reflection, an examination of the academic 
precedents so as to heed the warning of Bunge 
himself that certain destructive criticisms can be 
irresponsible (1 p.169).
Philosophy for physicians is a book that sheds 
light on transcendental topics, debunks myths 
and reminds us of many truths that all health care 
professionals, physicians in particular, would 
greatly benefit from knowing. Sadly, however, it 
contains confusing messages, suffers from some 
misconceptions and contains a number of mis-
takes. The present text highlights the merits, but 
does not avoid the examination of its fundamental 
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problems. I hope this review can serve as a contri-
bution to a topic of notable importance.
BUNGE’S STRONG POINTS
Among the most prominent merits of the 
work, we can find the expository eloquence and 
the simplicity with which the author communi-
cates relatively complex ideas. Bunge displays an 
elegant and clear language that makes the reading 
more pleasant while at the same time conveying 
his vast knowledge through precise and ap-
propriate examples and through a considerable 
amount of historical information and invaluable 
philosophical and methodological details.
The clear, flawless criticism to which he 
submits the pseudosciences deserves special 
praise. Although it is something that Mario Bunge 
has addressed in many of his previous works, his 
observations about false panaceas and his de-
nouncement of fraudulent therapies such as ho-
meopathy and folk medicine are established as 
solid and grounded acts of exposing medical prac-
tices alien to science. They also reveal the risks to 
which public health praxis is exposed when those 
involved ignore the importance of submitting their 
convictions to the judgment those procedures 
merit from a philosophical perspective and within 
an appropriate methodological framework.
Ultimately, Bunge highlights, time and time 
again, that nothing surpasses verdicts derived from 
objective experience, and especially from clinical 
trials in those areas in which they are permitted. 
A particularly suggestive proposal of his is to 
consider them not only as “gold standard” tests – 
something with which few people disagree – but 
also as a necessary condition to reach a higher 
stage in terms of resources for the generation of 
new medical knowledge (1 p.40). I am referring 
to what he calls the “platinum test,” which is 
given when the arguments, apart from being sup-
ported by the gold standard test, are supported by 
explanations of the mechanisms that allowed the 
standard to be bettered.
The understanding of the role of the placebo 
effect, as well as the fundamental importance of 
the theoretical plausibility of the hypotheses, the 
fallacies derived from the transgression of logical 
thought and the necessity of finding, to the extent 
possible, the causal mechanisms of the processes 
associated with health and illness, keeping in 
mind the systemic nature that defines them, are 
leitmotifs throughout the work.
His treatment of the social framework in 
which public health practice should be placed 
deserves special mention. Although the compre-
hension of the deeply social nature of the physi-
cian’s practice has long since been recognized 
and has been studied by prestigious figures espe-
cially since the 1950s, Bunge highlights it in an 
opportune manner. With a noticeable capacity 
for synthesis, the author establishes a difference 
between legality and morality and highlights the 
conflict that can arise between the rightful desire 
for personal well-being in the case of a health 
care professional, or for revenue in the case of a 
company that operates in the health field, and the 
commitment that each must make to truth and to 
the people they supposedly are to benefit.
SOME SPECIFIC MISTAKES
Some of the statements made in the book are 
simply erroneous. They may not have an intrinsic 
importance, but in light of the biting tone of the 
statements that make up the book, they are at the 
very least irritating. Let us see some examples.
The book states that the diagnostic hypothesis 
implicit in the syllogism “if the patient shows the 
sign or target indicator S, then it is possible that 
he/she has the disorder E” is based in biomedical 
studies, “especially in clinical trials” (1 p.16). This 
is incorrect, because experiments in humans are 
not used to identify target indicators typical of 
an illness, but to evaluate the effects of possible 
medical and public health interventions, as Bunge 
himself clarifies: “The central aim of clinical trials is 
to identify the real effects caused by the treatment 
being tried” (1 p.131). The elements used for the 
diagnosis can be the causes of the illness (like the 
presence of a virus in the development of dengue) 
or manifestations derived from them (like fever or 
itching skin from that same ailment). Causal ele-
ments are excluded from study for ethical reasons, 
since it is not acceptable for them to be induced 
in an experimental group in order to register 
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whether the occurrence of the illness is greater in 
one group than in another that was not the object 
of such intervention. The manifestations following 
the occurrence of the ailment cannot be evaluated 
by this method either, because clinical trials are, 
necessarily, prospective: it is not possible to create 
groups with and without said manifestations to 
examine the occurrence of the disorder in them, 
which occurs before.
In the diagnostic sphere itself, according to the 
book, if a refractory cough is observed, tuberculosis 
may be suspected, and x-rays or a blood test will 
allow the mechanism to be confirmed or denied 
practically in a conclusive way. And the author 
adds: “A cause has been found, which is, at the 
same time, the necessary and sufficient condition 
for the effect or sign in question to occur” (1 p.88). 
What mechanism is he referring to? What is the nec-
essary and sufficient condition for refractory cough 
to occur? The mentioned diagnostic methods could 
have revealed the presence of Koch’s bacillus, for 
example, but this is not a necessary condition for 
the appearance of the cough (many other agents 
can produce it) nor it is a sufficient condition, since 
not all bacillus carriers suffer from cough.
In other parts of the book, Bunge offers other 
erroneous examples related to the categories of 
necessity and sufficiency. He mentions that child 
malnutrition is a necessary and sufficient condition 
for delay in their development (1 p.143); but the 
reality is that such a condition is not necessary 
(malnutrition can appear as a consequence of in-
sufficient intake in a child whose development has 
been perfectly normal) nor is it sufficient (children 
can have delays in psychomotor or even physical 
development due to neurological problems 
that have nothing to do with their nutrition). 
Something similar occurs with dehydration and 
death. Dehydration is not a necessary and suffi-
cient cause for death, as it is affirmed. It is obvious 
that one can die without having suffered from de-
hydration, as is the case with a car accident or an 
opiate overdose.
Finally, a small detail, perhaps owing to an 
oversight: the statement that “only two outcomes 
are possible for any disease: recovery or death,” 
(1 p.163) is considered one of the big discoveries 
of the Hippocratic physician. Since this assertion is 
not questioned, Bunge is, in fact, validating it. This 
is, of course, not true. Many people never recover 
from an illness (for example, someone that suffers 
from retinitis pigmentosa, psoriasis or arthritis), but 
that disease does not lead to their death, either.
SUPERFICIAL CRITICISMS
Generally, Bunge is extremely biting, concise 
and conclusive. He rarely – perhaps never – uses 
expressions like “in my opinion”, “from my point 
of view”, “I think that.” It is his style. Sometimes, 
his works lack references to opinions that diverge 
from his point of view and that could or should 
be considered. But, generally, when we examine 
a text, we should take into account only what it 
is said in the text, without blaming the author for 
what he or she omits (a).
Now, within that style, the text presents 
global criticisms that quickly minimize the work 
of incredibly important and influential thinkers 
in the field of philosophy and medical thought. 
In this sense, the work aligns, at times, with the 
current tendency of the frivolization culture (2) (in 
this case, its scientific and philosophical aspects), 
making simplistic concessions that are surprising 
in a work with the scope and rigorousness de-
manded by the topic.
For example, in Bunge’s opinion, “physi-
cians philosophize all day” (1 p.13), while neither 
Friedrich Nietzsche nor Martin Heidegger were 
philosophers, but mere “paraphilosophical writers” 
who “by ranting against rationality and morality” 
made a single contribution: to Nazism (1 p.123). 
The least we can say is that this categorical sen-
tence is not serious and that it transmits a ridiculous 
and fragmented image of both intellectuals. While 
both thinkers awaken reservations in the political 
field, because the ideas of the former (who died 30 
years before the birth of Nazism) were used by the 
National Socialist regime, and because the latter 
was evasive in criticizing the regime, which also 
“used” part of his theories, they are extraordinarily 
important thinkers whose strictly philosophical 
work is enormous and, as a result, studied by the 
most important specialists the world over.
I will not go on with details that are somewhat 
beside the point, but it is enough to say that some 
of Nietzsche’s ideas (as well as his poetry and phil-
ological work) are among the most notable and 
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suggestive of the 19th century, while the work of 
Heidegger is simply monumental, and left its mark 
in the later philosophical undertakings not only of 
German and Anglo-Saxon intellectuals, but also 
of fundamental philosophers of Latin Europe, like 
Jean-Paul Sartre, Miguel de Unamuno and José 
Ortega y Gasset.
I am not an expert in psychology and much 
less in psychoanalysis. However, I strongly suspect 
that Bunge is right when he points out some ap-
parently ridiculous aspects of the psychoanalytical 
theory originally described by Sigmund Freud and 
later developed – and utilized – by his followers. 
Indeed, Karl Popper observed that Freud’s theories 
were not falsifiable, which allowed the data to be 
reinterpreted to uphold the hypotheses even if 
they did not have empirical support.
However, there is a big difference between 
making this observation and belittling Freud’s 
entire work. Bunge may be sure that this re-
searcher and thinker was “the worst psychologist 
of the century” (1 p.91), but this type of statement 
gives the impression that he is more given to 
emotion than to a paused examination of history 
and reality. In Bunge’s opinion, those who were 
taken in by Freud were either ignorant or looking 
to make a profit. I have the impression that things 
are not that simple. For example, I do not think 
that Clark University of Worcester, Massachusetts 
awarded Freud Doctor Honoris Causa (1930) for 
those reasons. Of course, all of this is a matter of 
opinion, and Bunge’s opinion is very respectable. 
However, to affirm that the Freudian cobwebs 
were swept away by a “storm of psychotropic 
drugs, which replaced the psychoanalytic myths” 
contains a fallacy. 
Although it is to a large extent correct that the 
Freudian myths have been swept away – despite 
the fact that his thought is still studied in many 
universities and schools of philosophy, even if 
only to criticize it, and that his ideas survive to 
some extent at least in the “Lacanian” circles – 
the problem lies in attributing that merit to drugs 
without a systematic reflection from a scientific 
perspective, considering most especially the con-
tributions of brilliant intellectuals and thinkers 
over the last century and even recently, as is the 
case of Michel Onfray (3).
No storm of psychotropic drugs has swept 
away, for example, the cognitive-behavioral 
orientation of psychotherapy, dominant today. 
We are facing a manifestation of the confusion re-
garding psychotropic drugs, some expressions of 
which have been harshly questioned at the same 
time that millions of people have been tricked by 
the sophistry deriving from the avarice of their 
promoters (4). This uncritical fascination incre-
ments when its victims are irresponsibly misin-
formed by physicians (5), or when the prescribers 
themselves are manipulated to the point that they 
start to believe that drugs are much more effective 
than they really are, giving way to a massive over-
treatment with antidepressant and antipsychotic 
drugs, as Peter Gøtzsche recently documented 
in an article appearing in the prestigious journal 
Trials (6).
We owe a lot to psychotropic drugs, but I am 
afraid that the “storm” of psychotropic drugs, par-
ticularly of the most famous drugs – selective in-
hibitors of serotonin recapture (such as fluoxetine 
and paroxetine) (7) – has been more harmful than 
Freud. As has been thoroughly documented (8), 
not only is there no corroboration whatsoever that 
low levels of serotonin produce mental disorders, 
but there is in fact significant evidence against this 
hypothesis, in addition to the other serious col-
lateral damage produced by these drugs (9).
Bunge is more reticent to criticize the 
Austro-British philosopher Karl Raimund Popper 
(1902-1994), who became a fundamental thinker 
after being accepted as part of the philosophical 
elite of his time (the so-called Frankfurt School) 
and later (in the 1950s and the1960s) as part of 
the famous seminars of the London School of 
Economics. Popper’s central idea can be summa-
rized in that science evolves through refutations 
and not through affirmations, and his argument is 
that a scientific idea can never be deemed true, 
because despite the many observations that ratify 
it, an idea can always be incorrect, so long as a 
single experiment or observation that contradicts 
that idea is enough to demonstrate its falseness 
(10). To that, he added that theories can always 
be criticized rationally and objectively, searching 
for and removing errors in such a way as to make 
it easier to distinguish between better theories 
and worse ones. Bunge uses a strange simile con-
nected to vegetables to refute these notions. He 
writes:
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Contrary to what Karl Popper taught, 
knowledge does not evolve by refuting conjec-
tures, but rather by finding truths, that is to say, 
confirming conjectures, especially hypotheses 
about action mechanisms. Similarly, the culti-
vation of vegetables involves weeding, but we 
eat vegetables, not weeds. (1 p.90)
I confess that I could not understand the 
analogy (what is analogous to what?) and that I 
cannot find any sign in it that could bring down 
the highly renowned Popperian point of view.
FASCINATION WITH DRUGS
In reality, Bunge’s uncritical seduction with 
drugs reaches beyond his opinion about psycho-
tropic drugs. “There are two pharmacopoeias: 
the effective, for rich people, and the illusory, for 
poor people,” Bunge states at one point (1 p.124). 
Part of the idea that the author seeks to transmit is 
correct, because it points to the well-established 
truth that pharmacological research centers on 
drugs that have a powerful market and disregards 
the typical illnesses of underdeveloped countries 
whose inhabitants cannot buy expensive drugs. 
But it also affirms a widely held but erroneous 
conviction that the drugs bought by “rich people” 
are effective. It is not difficult to refute this fallacy; 
one has only to delve into the vast amount of in-
formation on the subject.
During an international seminar carried 
out under the suggestive title of “The Hidden 
Incentive of Medicine” [El incentivo oculto en 
la medicina] in Mendoza, Argentina, in 2002, 
the president of the Federal Medical Association 
[Asociación Médica Federal], Miguel Matta, said 
ironically: “...in Argentina, for example, twelve 
thousand pharmacological formulations can be 
found, 12 times more than in Switzerland. The 
Swiss must be very sick, because they do not have 
our wide range of therapeutic options” (11). The 
total number of pharmacological specialties and 
formulations registered in Spain is 50% bigger 
than in Argentina, amounting to 18,250 in 2004 
(12); these drugs produce, annually, around 19 
million adverse effects and cause the death of 
6500 patients (13,14).
Sadly, physicians take an active part in the 
creation of such tragic statistics (15); they also 
contribute to the loss of many millions of dollars 
in our national economies each year, as noted by 
Gøtzsche in his article in the journal Trials (6). 
THE LEGACY OF IVAN ILLICH
Today, the reality described in the preceding 
section is well known. Four decades earlier it was 
only vaguely discerned, until the Austrian Ivan 
Illich burst onto the scene. Bunge’s criticism of 
Illich’s work is astonishing: “His writings are bad 
for individual and public health” (1 p.167).
I consider the book Medical Nemesis (16) to be 
a true classic that played a key role in the historical 
moment it was produced. It shook the foundations 
of the hegemony and the (very often irresponsible) 
arrogance of the medical class, and did so through 
a brilliant exhibition of ideas that nobody had 
dared to develop with such clarity and ease. It is 
not acceptable to eliminate in a few lines one of 
the most original thinkers to analyze the problems 
associated with medical practice during the second 
half of the last century. According to Bunge, Illich’s 
book illustrates the predominance of an ideology 
that generates “suspicion of science and of reason 
in general“ (1 p.195). However, such a vision ig-
nores that it was not science and much less reason 
that were on trial; on the contrary, through an 
impeccable rationality and a powerful scientific 
weaponry, deviations that affected the medical 
practice of that time – because of their irrationality 
and because they turned their back to the data pro-
vided by science – were under examination.
Bunge reacts angrily against Illich for “ac-
cusing medicine of ‘promoting illness’” (1 p.167). 
Accusing medicine as such in that manner would 
be a stupidity, in which Illich, of course, does not 
take part. That would be like accusing the iron and 
steel industry for the deaths caused by weapons. 
His accusation was against the way medicine 
was institutionalized, the medical establishment. 
Condemning the abominations affecting medicine 
cannot be confused with speaking “against med-
icine,” as Bunge tendentiously states (1 p.166), 
especially when Illich repeatedly admits many of 
its victories.
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Medical Nemesis begins by affirming that 
“institutionalized medicine has become a serious 
threat to health” (16 p.9). In this area, Illich was, 
above all, a visionary. He was ahead of his time 
when he defined and outlined a phenomenon that 
has not ceased to grow alarmingly: the invention 
of illnesses (17) and the medicalization of society 
(18). Bunge’s own definition of this latter concept 
is insufficient; he describes it as “the attempt to 
disguise social problems as medical problems” 
(1 p.167). In some way that statement is true but, 
as Teresa Forcades (19) brilliantly explains and il-
lustrates, what is sought through medicalization 
is to face social problems through medical inter-
ventions done on the individual that suffers from 
them. Additionally, the medicalization of society 
includes an important problem that his definition 
does not cover: the transformation of natural pro-
cesses or features into illnesses (baldness, old age, 
erectile dysfunction at an advanced age, shyness, 
menopause, etc.) (20-25) and the management of 
vital events as if they were ailments (birth, unhap-
piness or grief due to the death of a loved one) (26-
27), with the resulting intervention – unnecessary 
and very often iatrogenic – through therapeutic 
actions. 
To illustrate the rigorousness found in the 
whole of Illich’s book, I take the liberty of quoting 
only one paragraph (the eight references that 
appear in this paragraph correspond to the re-
spective studies that Illich cites and comments at 
the bottom of the page):
In the United States, the volume of the drug 
business has grown by a factor of 100 during 
the current century:105 20,000 tons of aspirin 
are consumed per year, almost 225 tablets 
per person.106 In England, every tenth night 
of sleep is induced by a hypnotic drug and 
19 percent of women and 9 percent of men 
take a prescribed tranquilizer during any one 
year.107 In the United States, central-nervous-
system agents are the fastest-growing sector 
of the pharmaceutical market, now making 
up 31 percent of total sales.108 Dependence 
on prescribed tranquilizers has risen by 
290 percent since 1962, a period during 
which the per capita consumption of liquor 
rose by only 23 percent and the estimated 
consumption of illegal opiates by about 50 
percent.109 A significant quantity of “uppers” 
and “downers” is obtained in all countries 
by circumventing the doctor.110 Medicalized 
addiction111 in 1975 has outgrown all self-
chosen or more festive forms of creating 
well-being.112 (16 p.95).
“What was radical in 1974 is in some sense 
mainstream,” said the famous editor of the British 
Medical Journal, Richard Smith, in an editorial 
written 30 years after the publication of Medical 
Nemesis (28). Smith praises the power of the book 
as “undiminished” and highlights Illich’s notable 
prescience; he concludes by recommending the 
study of the book to every physician and student 
of medicine. In effect, Illich was ahead of his time 
in denouncing so-called “disease mongering,” as 
it is known today.
This phenomenon has been widely discussed 
in recent years. Bunge makes a lukewarm but 
correct allusion to invented illnesses by making 
reference to “the hormonal deficiencies and 
mental illnesses fabricated by certain pharmaceu-
tical laboratories” (1 p.66). He also mentions ho-
mosexuality, which “despite being no more than 
a deviation of the statistical norm, was included 
until 1974 in the list of mental disorders of the 
American Psychiatric Association.” Personally, 
I do not believe that this sexual inclination is a 
deviation, whether statistical or of any other type 
(b), like being exceptionally gifted, left-handed 
or redheaded. I do not know what a “statistical 
norm” [norma estadística] is, but in Spanish, a 
“norm” [norma] is a rule one must follow or a rule 
to which conducts must adjusted. If it was once 
considered a psychiatric disorder, or if in some 
areas it is still conceptualized as a deviation, it is 
not because of a statistical feature, but because of 
scientific nonsense or because reprehensible cul-
tural prejudice prevails.
Now, the problem of disease-mongering is not 
circumscribed only to a small number of imaginary 
illnesses, but it is something deeply rooted; one 
has only to see the vast literature that addresses the 
topic (29-32) and denounces the overwhelming 
amount. In any case, the solid and consistent con-
temporary dissection of the phenomenon is direct 
heir to the seminal work of Ivan Illich.
Finally, Bunge makes the unbelievable 
statement that Illich’s work maintains that “medicine 
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causes more illnesses than those it cures,” and he 
loftily adds that Illich did so with no objective data 
to support his statement. He does not say that the 
work is insufficiently supported by research, which 
would be equally surprising, but could at least be 
accepted given that insufficiency is relative and 
subjective. But no, Bunge affirms that Illich’s work 
has not “the least empirical backing” (1 p.195). 
One asks oneself if Bunge really read Illich’s work 
or if he does not remember it well, since one of its 
most striking features is the overwhelming amount 
of data Ivan Illich provides to support his statements 
(c), as we saw in the paragraph quoted above. I 
have the impression that precisely because Illich 
knew that his book would arouse the furious re-
action of the medical stratum, he put special energy 
into supporting every assertion with precise and 
convincing data.
Pharmaceutical sales representatives, 
manipulation and physician-centrism
Some of the book’s surprising perspectives 
can only be explained by a considerable lack of 
information. The most disconcerting example is 
Bunge’s consideration that, to be up-to-date on the 
advances in medicine, physicians should educate 
themselves through “pharmaceutical sales repre-
sentatives” (1 p.184), because in his opinion they 
constitute one of the three sources of current infor-
mation (the other sources are reading medical lit-
erature and attending seminars and conferences). 
Although in the Preface he suggests that physicians 
must be vigilant and filter the information phar-
maceutical representatives provide, this warning 
vanishes in the rest of the book. It is no secret that 
the only task assigned to these workers – whose 
salaries are generally paid by international drug 
companies – is to guarantee that the drugs pro-
duced by their employers are prescribed, whether 
or not rigorous studies that put them in question 
exist, and very frequently through the use of direct 
or cloaked forms of bribery.
It is rather obvious that we should not 
let foxes guard the henhouse, even if we are 
watchful of their conduct. Personally, I find 
Bunge’s suggestion an awful way of keeping 
atop scientific progress; the evaluation of such 
progress demands, above all, an atmosphere 
of transparency, honesty and debate. Although 
the transcendent French philosopher Michel 
Foucault (d) may have made some mistakes, his 
reflection that truth in the collective imaginary 
is that which is established by power is a dra-
matically pertinent and current observation. The 
asphyxiating dominance of media power, and 
of the companies to which the media’s power is 
subjected, is what ends up imposing “the truth.” 
Health professionals – in particular, those who 
prescribe drugs and therefore hold enormous po-
tential to generate profits for the laboratories – 
are far from immune to such manipulation.
Bunge’s reflections are tinged by a physician-
centrism that is present directly or indirectly 
throughout the text. It is true that it is a book 
“for physicians,” as the title of the work suggests. 
However, to accurately examine the tasks and 
ethical and philosophical problems associated 
with physicians, the large group of professionals 
that interact with them must also be taken into ac-
count. For diagnosis or for therapeutic, preventive 
or rehabilitative actions, current medical sciences 
demand interdisciplinary interactions including 
many other specialists: cybernetics experts, physi-
cists, biochemists, nurses, biotechnologists, odon-
tologists, statisticians, physiatrists, psychologists, 
pharmacists, engineers, and even lawyers, jour-
nalists, social workers, documentary makers and 
economists, just to mention some of the disciplines.
Instead of undertaking the enormous task of 
signaling the many points in the text where omis-
sions could be important, it is more practical for 
me to concentrate on an area in which Bunge’s 
anachronism manifests itself most evidently: his 
conceptions regarding Nursing.
The patriarchal language he uses – always 
making reference to the “médico” [male physician] 
and “enfermera” [female nurse] – is surprising, be-
cause, although the masculine desinence is all-in-
clusive in Spanish, which is something that could 
justify the lack of the noun “médica” [female phy-
sician], that condition is also present in the word 
“enfermero” [male nurse], expression which he 
nonetheless never uses. Additionally, all of his 
considerations correspond to the traditional model 
that regards the nurse as a mere auxiliary to the 
medical consultation and promotes an elitist en-
dogamy within the medical body. It is worthwhile 
to quote him in extenso:
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In recent years, many Faculties of Nursing 
have been established in which graduate de-
grees are offered and professors can receive 
research subsidies [...]. Without a doubt, 
it was time to recognize the importance of 
Nursing. But, is this craft benefited by sepa-
rating it from medicine and making it pass as 
a science? And are patients benefited if we re-
place their physician with a nurse or if a hier-
archy of care which is based in a hierarchy of 
knowledge is subverted? In other fields, crafts-
people are professionally recognized without 
academic pomp. For example, we all respect 
good parents, constructors, electricians, 
X-ray technicians, pilots, laboratory experts 
and filmmakers, but nobody suggests giving 
them advanced academic degrees. Master’s 
Degree in fatherhood? Charlie Chaplin, PhD? 
Craftspeople do not learn through books, but 
through work, and they are useful when they 
work under the supervision of experts with 
wide and deep knowledge who are up to date 
with specialized literature. Strictly speaking, 
medical technology [...] is something dif-
ferent: it requires not only ingenuity and 
manual ability, but also a great deal of scien-
tific knowledge. (1 p.189) [Own translation] 
In an unfortunate homage to the medical 
class, Bunge cautions against breaking the health 
care hierarchy (that is to say, for the physician to 
no longer be conceptualized as more important 
than the nurse), since it is based in a knowledge 
hierarchy (in other words, that the knowledge of 
physicians is more important than the knowledge 
of nurses). It is not difficult to understand that 
it is not a matter of who knows more when the 
knowledge is regarding different though comple-
mentary fields (34). In addition, I do not think that 
by giving academic status to Nursing anybody is 
proposing that physicians should disappear, and 
that the care of the patients should depend only 
on specialists of the Nursing discipline. However, 
Bunge seems to be taking for granted that some-
thing like that could happen, and he deems it nec-
essary to call attention to such a dangerous change 
of course for patients.
His words can be summarized in this way: 
we should respect nurses but put them in their 
place; we should not forget they are mere crafts-
people (e) who have nothing to research and who 
should work under the supervision of those that 
truly possess wide and deep knowledge. They 
should be obedient and dedicated to their sub-
ordinated task.
If it were up to him, the many scientific 
journals on Nursing registered in Scopus and 
Medline might perhaps be eliminated, as well as 
the thousands of books on this discipline being 
produced at present. Scientific literature is unnec-
essary for those who only need manual ability and 
ingenuity, like construction workers.
He ignores that for many years Nursing has 
had its own functions, including health promotion, 
maintenance and recovery, which are crucial not 
only for the treatment of ailments and disabilities, 
but also for their prevention (35). Clinging to a con-
ception long since overcome, Bunge asserts that 
they do not have their own system of knowledge, 
and he defends, on that basis, an operative and 
intellectual subordination that would carry health 
care back to the models that were dominant in 
both theory and practice at the beginning of the 
20th century. In effect, in 1902, Joseph McGregor 
Robertson, with a medical degree from the 
University of Glasgow confirmed: “A nurse must 
begin her work with the idea firmly implanted in 
her mind that she is only the instrument by whom 
the doctor gets his instructions carried out; she oc-
cupies no independent position in the treatment of 
the sick person” (36). And, in 1917, Sarah Dock, a 
registered nurse from Kentucky, wrote:
No matter how gifted she may be she will 
never become a reliable nurse until she can 
obey without question. The first and most 
helpful criticism I ever received from a doctor 
was when he told me that I was supposed 
to be simply an intelligent machine for the 
purpose of carrying out his orders. (37) 
But some of Bunge’s ideas take actually us 
a century and a half back. Let us see Florence 
Nightingale’s ironic view of this subject in 1860:
No man, not even a doctor, ever gives any 
other definition of what a nurse should be 
than this — “devoted and obedient.” This 
definition would do just as well for a porter. It 
might even do for a horse. (38) 
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Skills and ingenuity are, of course, necessary, 
like in any other profession, medicine included. 
But it would be impossible to list all the nursing 
tasks that call for independent decision-making 
when dealing with patients as well as highly spe-
cialized and subspecialized knowledge – tasks 
therefore unable to be carried out efficiently by 
anybody not well-versed and scientifically up to 
date in those domains.
PROBABILITY THEORY AND 
SUBJECTIVITY
Apart from some specific errors and state-
ments that, in my opinion, arise from a process 
of thought that is rigid or stuck in conservative vi-
sions, most of the critical observations made thus 
far point to Bunge’s exaggerations, simplifications 
or trivializations. But that is not the case when the 
author delves into the world of probabilities and 
Bayesian thought, where he shows himself to be 
especially erroneous. The detailed examination of 
Bunge’s mistakes in this matter demands technical 
considerations that go beyond this reflection, and 
can be consulted elsewhere (39), but I will allow 
myself to outline the essence of such errors.
His fundamental errors – and the foundation 
of his entire incursion in the topic – reside, firstly, 
in failing to understand that arbitrariness and sub-
jectivity are two completely different concepts; 
and, secondly, in considering that probability is 
a notion exclusively applicable to intrinsically 
random processes (in the sense they are not gov-
erned by a casual mechanism). Let us review 
briefly both topics.
Bunge affirms that “because they are sub-
jective, Bayesian probabilities are arbitrary” (1 
p.99). Arbitrariness and whim compromise any 
scientific discourse, but it is well-known that sub-
jectivity in science is inevitable, as it is almost 
universally admitted (40,41). This reality includes 
the field of probability. Based on that misunder-
standing, Bunge attributes a capricious conduct to 
Bayesian statistics. “The Bayesian assigns whatever 
probabilities he feels like” (1 p.99) Bunge affirms, 
and some pages later he goes beyond that to em-
phatically claim “we cannot speak of probabilities 
in medicine” (1 p.101).
The idea present in the subjective interpre-
tation of probability is that, given a random phe-
nomenon or a phenomenon conceived as such to 
solve a certain problem (in the sense that the phe-
nomenon can be verified and that it is impossible 
to know beforehand what outcomes will occur), a 
probability representing the degree of confidence 
or belief that one has in the occurrence is implicitly 
or explicitly assigned. Under this approach, the 
probability is not determined beforehand, but it is 
established according to the available information 
– quantitative or not – about the situation, as well 
as the way in which said information is valued.
The essential difference with frequentist inter-
pretation lies in that the assignment of values, al-
though conditioned by the available information, 
is an attribute of each particular observer, without 
a need for the opinions of different analysts to co-
incide exactly. Under the frequentist approach, 
the probability of a given event is a single and 
ideal number (specifically, the limit of the ratio 
between the number of times said occurrence 
takes place and the number of times in which the 
process that could produce it is carried out, when 
this last number tends to be infinite), and what can 
vary are the estimates we make of this number.
When someone says that the probability of 
Brazil beating North Korea in a World Cup match 
is equal to 0.95, the probability of a draw is 0.04 
and the probability of Brazil losing the match is 
0.01, these numbers were not chosen from a table 
of random numbers nor according to aesthetic pref-
erences. They were set on a subjective basis – the 
performance of the forwards in recent matches, the 
number of players who already have a yellow card, 
the market value of the goalkeepers, the results ob-
tained in recent matches and the quality of the ad-
versaries in those matches, etc. – but they are not 
arbitrary (f). If betting houses fixed the probabilities 
on which wins are based simply to suit their mood 
or aesthetic preferences, rather than making big 
profits they would go bankrupt.
Obviously, for this interpretation to be suc-
cessfully applied in an operative framework, it is 
necessary for those that utilize it to maintain a high 
degree of rationality in the assignation of probabil-
ities. If we want to make valid inferences, the values 
determined cannot be the result of the whims or 
feelings of the person setting them. Once the de-
grees of confidence about the occurrence of the 
Salud Colectiva | Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International Public License | BY - NC 
112 SILVA AYÇAGUER LC.
SA
LU
D
 C
O
LE
C
TI
V
A
, B
ue
no
s 
A
ire
s,
 9
(1
):1
03
-1
16
, J
an
ua
ry
 - 
A
pr
il,
 2
01
3
events have been assigned through that method, if 
the relevant values satisfy the Kolmogorov axioms 
(42), we can work with these probabilities just as 
we do with probabilities defined in any other way 
that also fulfill those axioms.
“Only random and randomly chosen events 
have probabilities” (1 p.100) Bunge maintains. It 
is clearly difficult or impossible to interpret the 
concept of an event having a probability. Events 
do not have probabilities; they have probabilities 
of occurrence assigned to them by one method 
or another if this is considered to be fruitful. This 
is not a trivial detail, but rather is fundamental: 
while the first points to a feature that would 
supposedly be intrinsic to certain “events,” the 
second is a convention that generally is adopted 
for operative purposes.
Bunge communicates to us that Bayesian inter-
pretation is not appropriate for the health sciences. 
As surprising as it may be, he bases this conviction 
on the idea that in health sciences there is not a 
wide diversity of opinions. According to Bunge, 
patients and physicians fortunately know that “if 
there are different opinions regarding a treatment 
or a diagnosis, the opinion of a third party or a 
group of experts is generally asked for; and these 
people are expected to give not only their opinion, 
but also arguments based in the biomedical sci-
ences” (1 p.101). What Bunge does not see is that, 
in any case, we are talking about an opinion that, 
as such, will inexorably involve some degree of 
subjectivity to a greater or lesser extent. It could 
be no other way: biomedical sciences are not only 
full of uncertainty, provisional truths, controversies 
and doubts, but they also assume that certain 
things to be true that are in fact not true (43). And 
finally, grounded arguments are not exclusive to 
biomedical sciences; they are also present in the 
assignation of probabilities, and such assignation 
can similarly be adopted after consulting with an-
other specialist or appealing to a panel of experts.
Now, the essence of this debate resides in 
the following question: On what basis can a given 
methodological approach be accepted or rejected 
in the context of the solution of a problem? In the 
framework we are discussing, this can be trans-
lated into the following question: Who could be 
the arbitrator that concedes or denies the validity 
of assigning probabilities to events that are not in-
trinsically random?
MODEL LEGITIMACY
Let us examine more closely the statement 
that “it is not appropriate to assign a probability 
to any kind of event. Only random and randomly 
chosen events have probabilities” (1 p.100).
A model is understood as an idealization or 
representation of reality which tries to simplify 
reality so as to examine it better and then use 
the model’s derivations towards the solution of a 
problem in the context of complexity that inspired 
the model. As such, a model only admits a prag-
matic evaluation. In other words: since the con-
struction of model responds to an attempt to solve 
a problem by observing its behavior, the model 
can only be discredited if it does not contribute 
to solving the problem that led to its conception.
This is the same logic that can be applied 
when assessing the legitimacy of a way of be-
having in order to resolve any practical problem. 
Leaving aside the ethical dimension, which is 
another topic, the legitimacy of that behavior de-
pends on the degree to which it helps solve the 
problem for which it was employed. It cannot be 
“illegitimate” if it is useful, nor “legitimate” if it is 
useless.
It is obvious that if Brazil wins, there is a spe-
cific reason (during the match Brazil scored more 
goals than North Korea); and if Obama wins the 
elections, it is for reasons that made it possible for 
him to obtain more votes than his adversaries. The 
outcome is the result of those causes, whatever 
they might be; but the outcome can be managed 
like a random event due to the fact that there is 
no way whatsoever to identify the outcome with 
certainty beforehand, even if we know the value 
of some of the variables that could influence it.
If betting houses were subject to Bunge’s 
dogma, they would not make the million-dollar 
profits they make (44); and if Nate Silver would 
have obeyed Bunge’s methodological mandate, he 
would not have had the incredible success he had 
with his predictions about the US elections (45).
Bunge repudiates the use of the probability 
theory even in situations where by definition sub-
jectivity does not intervene. He goes so far as to say 
that calling the relative frequencies used by epide-
miologists “probabilities” is “doubly erroneous: 
because frequencies are collective properties and 
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because the use of probabilities is only justified in 
reference to random processes, given that under-
lying processes have causal roots” (1 p.102). And 
then he returns to the topic stating that:
It is often said that there is a “probability” that 
a specific treatment can cure a specific illness, 
but this use of the concept of probability is 
incorrect, because the concept in question 
is theoretical, not empirical. The so-called 
“probabilities” spoken of in medicine and epi-
demiology are in fact relative frequencies, and 
these are not necessarily (logically) related to 
randomness. (1 p.142) [Our own translation] 
He then concludes that “physicians [...] will 
do well if they limit themselves to statistical fre-
quencies” (1 p.142), without considering them 
to be probabilities. If relative frequencies cannot 
be considered to be probabilities – a dictum in-
vented by Bunge (g) – one could not, just to give 
an example, calculate life expectancy, a major pa-
rameter of contemporary public health based on 
probability theory.
In conclusion, Bunge’s decisive negation of 
the use of probability theory in the health field 
remits us to the controversy that took place in the 
mid-9th century, when the urologist-surgeon Jean 
Civiale (1792-1867) attempted to use statistics to 
decide between two treatments for operating on 
bladder stones. The debate, with the participation 
of renowned figures such as Siméon Poisson, was 
brought to the Paris Academy of Sciences. One 
of the commissioners, the Spaniard Risueño de 
Amador (1802-1849) made a pronouncement 
that could have come from Bunge himself: “The 
calculation of probabilities appears to be very im-
perfect, even mathematically speaking, because 
mathematicians cannot come to an agreement 
about important aspects of the theory. Its appli-
cation in medicine, in therapeutic medicine above 
all, is anti-scientific” (46). Finally, however, the 
Academy ruled in favor of Civiale’s methodology 
of analysis: “Medicine is a science of observation, 
exactly like the other sciences; statistics and the 
calculation of probability have something to tell 
us regarding the conclusions we should reach, and 
with what degree of confidence we must reach 
them” (47).
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a. I have to admit, however, that one is tempted to 
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book there is no mention whatsoever of the internet 
and the new information and communication te-
chnologies, as if they did not have enormous and 
growing importance in the practical, conceptual, 
axiological, technological and, consequently, phi-
losophical fields of health praxis.
b. Bunge also addresses this idea earlier in the 
text. There, he does not talk about homosexuality 
as a feature, but rather homosexuals themselves, 
explaining that while in previous years homo-
sexuals were condemned, “today they are consi-
dered mere statistical deviations” (1 p.50).
c. In fact, the notes containing these references 
make up approximately half of the whole volume.
d. The importance of the author of The Order of 
Things  is beyond all reasonable doubt, although 
his work is in large part trivialized by Bunge, who 
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writes that if Foucault “would have understood 
that ‘promiscuity is bad for health’, he would not 
have died of AIDS” (1 p.65).
e. That is, “a person that exercises a merely me-
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that Royal Spanish Academy gives for the term 
“craftsperson” [artesano].
f. These two teams have never before played 
against one another, therefore it would be impos-
sible to make a frequentist estimation.
g. I do not know if any other philosopher, episte-
mologist or mathematician shares this view; I per-
sonally do not know anyone who shares it.
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